We take this for granted now, but the idea that one should tailor activities to produce orderly results was radical at the time. In other words, adding to the idea of functional definition, he took a pragmatic approach to specifying behavior, allowing definition to be influenced by results. Third, Skinner argued that such definitions need not be fixed in advance one can choose one's definition according to what works, what produces “smooth curves” ( Skinner, 1961/1956). Without it, a science would have been practically impossible. This recognition freed behavior analysis from physiology and allowed definition of behavior by function. “Lever press” is an adequate specification, even though the movement of the lever might be accomplished by left paw, right paw, or nose. Thus, “red key light” is an adequate specification, even though the light may appear differently when viewed from different angles. A stimulus or response should be defined by what it does, rather than how it looks. He argued that a stimulus or a response is a class, not a unique event. A simple, easily repeated response, coupled with a feeder and the means for presenting stimuli, proved to be an excellent preparation for studying all sorts of behavioral phenomena and a springboard to gaining some insight into everyday behavior of humans usually called “voluntary.” Second, Skinner elucidated the generic nature of stimulus and response ( Skinner, 1961/1935). First of all, he invented a preparation for studying behavior in the laboratory ( Skinner, 1961/1956). To begin, we have Skinner's methodological contributions. To say these made the science possible would be no understatement. In explicating his point of view, Skinner made several advances that one may fairly say established a conceptual base for behavior analysis. This definition is compatible with Moore's (by his own admission “tortuous” p. 431), except that he includes a gratuitous assertion of the nonexistence of mental things and events (discussed below). No amount of understanding of mechanism can substitute for an understanding of history. Neurophysiology may be omitted too, not because it is hypothetical, but because it reveals only mechanism and not how present behavior came to be. That is, accounts of behavior with respect to environment and evolution leave nothing out: no internal states, intervening variables, or hypothetical constructs are required. From these two implications comes the conclusion that behavioral events may be understood and analyzed in relation to past and present environment and evolutionary history without residue. This is what makes radical behaviorism “radical.” In a natural science of behavior, behavioral events are natural events, an idea with two counter-intuitive implications: a) behavioral events, like tides, oxidation, cell division, and evolution, are not done-involve no agency-but just happen ( Baum, 1995) and b) behavioral events, like tides, oxidation, cell division, and evolution are to be explained by other natural events (i.e., not by ghostly inner entities or essences). Radical behaviorism takes a further step and asserts that a science of behavior can be a natural science. The central proposition of behaviorism-the idea that all behaviorists agree about and that defines behaviorism-is the idea that a science of behavior is possible ( Baum, 2005). Moore's book would give an unwary reader a highly distorted picture of contemporary behavior analysis and radical behaviorism. It also includes almost no developments in radical behaviorism since Skinner. The book's portrayal of behavior analysis would have been current around 1960 it mentions almost none of the developments since then. In fact, Moore adds a few mistakes of his own manufacture for example, he insists that the mental realm does not exist-an unprovable and distracting assertion. It focuses narrowly on a few of Skinner's concepts (mostly mentalism and verbal behavior) and contains no criticism of his mistakes. Moore's book presents a “party line” version of radical behaviorism. Subsequent developments in radical behaviorist thought have attempted to remedy these mistakes. Besides these achievements, however, Skinner also made some mistakes. His founding innovations included: a versatile preparation for studying behavior explicating the generic nature of stimulus and response a pragmatic criterion for defining behavioral units response rate as a datum the concept of stimulus control the concept of verbal behavior and explicating the explanatory power of contingencies. Skinner founded both radical behaviorism and behavior analysis.
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